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Response to Christopher Odinet, SuperLiens to the Rescue? A Case Against
Special Districts in Real Estate Finance
Peter W. Salsich, Jr.*
Professor Odinet’s excellent article, Super-Liens to the
Rescue? A Case Against Special Districts in Real Estate Finance,1
calls attention to the increasing use, and the attendant risks, of
special taxing districts to finance infrastructure for private
residential developments. He focuses on a specific type of special
district, what he terms the “development special district,” in
examining the pressures brought to bear on American local
governments in the aftermath of the recent housing crisis and the
Great Recession.2
A complex, ten-page hypothetical, reminding one of the
intricate fact patterns law students often confront on final exams,
introduces Professor Odinet’s topic.3 A fictitious couple, Henry
and Claire, purchased a home during the early stages of
development of Beau Chateaux, a large, upscale, and gated
community. Beau Chateaux offered a range of services and
amenities paid for by the proceeds of bonds issued by a statutorily
* McDonnell Professor of Justice in American Society Emeritus, Saint
Louis University School of Law.
1. Christopher K. Odinet, Super-Liens to the Rescue? A Case Against
Special Districts in Real Estate Finance, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707 (2015).
2. See id. at 723–25
In the wake of these events, political tolerance for centralized
decision-making—and spending—has declined significantly. In its
place has been a rise of an intense focus on cities and local
governments. But municipalities have, in many ways, a heavier yoke
to carry in the wake of the financial downturn . . . . [L]ocal
government decision-making has been steered precariously toward
the creation of more and more special taxing districts as an
instrument for economic, financial, and cultural viability, which has,
in turn, served as an invitation for abuse and poor policymaking.
3. Id. at 709–18.
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authorized, city council-created governmental entity called a
“development special district.” The development special district
had been created at the request of Beau Chateaux’s developer. Its
boundaries were co-terminus with Beau Chateaux. Its threeperson board, selected by the developer and appointed by the city
council, had the authority to issue bonds backed by the power of
the special district to impose special assessments and property
taxes on homeowners in Beau Chateaux.
Henry and Claire purchased their home at the top of the
recent housing boom and did not notice that many of the lots
remained vacant. When the Great Recession hit in 2007–2008,
people stopped buying homes and lots in Beau Chateaux. Neither
could the developer honor its obligations, nor could the
development taxing district, which had issued a large number of
bonds to finance the development’s infrastructure and amenities.
After the developer declared bankruptcy, Realty Bank, which had
financed the developer’s land acquisition, filed foreclosure
proceedings. The bondholders also began foreclosure proceedings,
setting up a duel for priority status. Beau Chateaux’s troubles
mirrored those of the real estate market nationally, leaving
millions of borrowers facing foreclosure:
As part of the special district legal structure, the nonpayment
of special assessments charged against the parcels within the
development—much like with traditional real property taxes—
created a lien on the individual lots. These in turn could be
foreclosed upon like any other security device. And, also like
real property taxes, this lien—although the product of an
entirely private enterprise, used entirely for profit, and the
financing of which was controlled by the developer—is
accorded superpriority over and above any pre-existing
security rights . . . [including Realty Bank’s first mortgage]
and, when foreclosed, would wipe out and completely destroy
the lien of the bank.4

Henry, Claire, and the other residents of Beau Chateaux
realized they were in trouble when both the bondholders and the
bank took them to court over the relative priority of the two sets
of liens. The foreclosure proceedings became wake-up calls for the
residents, as they began to understand that not only was title to
4.

Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted).
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their homes in jeopardy, but also that the unfinished and
neglected
development
infrastructure—streets,
sidewalks,
community park, community center, and golf course, as well as
the large number of vacant houses and lots—was casting a pall
over the value of their homes and those in adjoining
neighborhoods.
Professor Odinet argues that widespread use of special
taxing districts by private residential real estate developers
played a major role in the housing collapse and resulting
foreclosure crisis during the Great Recession. In his view, private
developer use of special taxing districts led to four adverse
results: (1) developer overextension of the special taxing districts,
(2) producing substantial ripple effects in surrounding
communities, (3) resulting in excessive subordination of
residential mortgage loans, and (4) causing traditional real estate
lenders and the residential secondary mortgage market to curtail
sharply residential lending, particularly in lower-income
neighborhoods.5
Development special districts are a variation of traditional
special taxing districts commonly used to finance public
infrastructure, such as water and sewer facilities or fire
protection services for a relatively large area like a municipality
or a county. He notes that special taxing districts have spread
from one fire protection district in Rhode Island in 1797 to
“roughly as many special districts as there are counties,
townships and cities across the United States combined.”6
Professor Odinet explains that, while development special
districts usually are established by local governments, they
typically are organized to serve private residential developments
governed by homeowners associations and cover much smaller
areas
within
sponsoring
municipalities
and
counties.
Development special districts give private, profit-motivated
developers access to the tax-exempt municipal bond technique as
a financing mechanism for infrastructure to serve self-contained
residential developments, including upscale, gated communities.
Because of the Federalism principle limiting the ability of one
5.
6.

Id. at 718–21.
Id. at 736.
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level of government to tax the income of another level of
government, interest income on municipal bonds and notes is not
taxable. Thus, the cost of borrowing money to finance residential
development may be 1%–2% less through development special
districts than through private lending sources. Bonds and notes
typically are retired through payments made by residents
receiving the benefits of development special district financing,
usually through special assessments on their residential
property.
Professor Odinet’s concern is the relative priority that should
be granted these bonds and notes. He sharply criticizes state
enabling legislation that grants development special district
bonds and notes superpriority status over senior residential
mortgage loans provided by banks to enable developers to acquire
land in the first place. Superpriority status, in his view, can lead
to several unintended consequences, including taking mortgage
lenders’ property without just compensation, destabilizing the
conventional mortgage market, causing the secondary mortgage
market to shy away from purchasing residential mortgages
within a development special district, and creating “a substantial
negative effect on fundamental market fairness.”7
Odinet believes development special districts “have the
potential to serve a valid purpose” if they are limited to financing
the “development of areas that would otherwise be cut off from
the lending market.”8 But he worries that cities will find the lure
of potential economic development bonanzas “too tempting.”
Professor Odinet believes “cities have become ravenous for new
forms of tax revenues,” primarily because of the substantial loss
in local revenue cities have suffered since the Great Recession as
a result of significant declines in property values, along with
severe cuts in federal and state financial assistance to local
governments.
Odinet discusses reform possibilities, including a contractual
mechanism requiring developers to obtain consent of first priority
mortgage lenders before creating a development special district,
and legislation restricting the use of development special districts
7.
8.

Id. at 758–78.
Id. at 740.
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to projects which “could not occur without public support”9 and
which would serve to “ameliorat[e] an economically depressed or
underserved area.”10 The contract approach has a “major
drawback,” in that local governments create development special
districts and cannot be bound by private contract without their
approval. He is wary of a legislative approach because he believes
that state and local legislatures are unlikely to “truly evaluate
each development special district request with a discerning
eye.”11
Professor Odinet settles on a recommendation that courts use
the doctrine of equitable subordination “to police situations
whereby special district liens were used in overreaching ways to
the prejudice of the pre-existing rights of third parties . . . .”12 He
proposes a “two-step process” in which courts, using market
analyses, economic studies, and risk analyses, would first
determine whether the developer could have received financing
through “traditional channels and achieved the same result as he
did using the special district.”13 If the answer was yes,
development special district liens “should be subordinated to the
rights of the pre-existing mortgagee.”14 If the answer is no, the
court should then move to the second part of the test to determine
whether the developer could show through “substantiated
evidence” that the project would provide “tangible benefits to an
economically distressed area.”15 “[D]oes the development bring
jobs, blight improvement, or other economic benefits to an area
that is in need of investment, resources, and opportunity?”16 If
the answer to this question is yes, “the superpriority of the
special district lien should be respected.”17

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 784.
Id.
Id. at 780–84.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id. at 786–87.

186

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 181 (2015)

Describing his approach as a “balancing of interests,”
Professor Odinet compares it to long-standing federal bankruptcy
court practice and the state court doctrine of unconscionable
contracts. He asserts that in both situations, courts play an
important role in balancing interests of competing creditors, as
well as debtors.18
Professor Odinet’s approach merits careful consideration.
Certainly the courts can, and should, police public debt
transactions when interests of private parties are implicated. But
has he overreacted in one direction to correct an overreaction in
the other direction by cities and states before and during the
Great Recession? He raises a basic policy question: to what extent
should states authorize local governments to use public
borrowing powers in the pursuit of private investment, and in the
process provide superpriority status to special district liens that
may prejudice the rights of prior mortgage lenders and other preexisting creditors? To answer that policy question, he turns to the
courts and the doctrine of equitable subordination previously
noted.19 But courts are not supposed to make policy; their role is
to resolve disputes that may arise out of the application of a given
policy. Courts play a vital role in guarding against excessive
favoritism and misuse of taxing and spending powers. But judges,
for the most part, are appointed, not elected. They do not
represent the people affected by use, or abuse, of development
special districts.
We elect legislators to debate and resolve policy questions.
We should not turn our backs on the legislative process because
of excessive, and perhaps unwise, legislative decisions during a
period of severe economic pressure and panic. Policy is
established through the weighing and balancing that is the
essence of the legislative process. The democratic ideals of
inclusion and consideration of all relevant interests, and the
necessary compromises by representatives of those interests, are
fostered through the legislative process. It may be messy, but it is
the essence of our democracy.
18. Id. at 788–90.
19. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining the adverse results
of private developer use of special taxing districts).
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Professor Odinet’s proposed test can be applied to the
legislative process. State enabling legislation can limit city
council authority to create development special districts by
requiring the council to make a legislative finding that projects
supported by development special districts provide “tangible
benefits to an economically distressed area.”20 The same burden
can be placed on a developer to provide “substantiated evidence,”
including “actual data and tangible evidence to support realistic
projections as to the benefits that will accrue to the target area.”21
The term “substantiated evidence” suggests evidence
introduced by persons who testify under oath and are subject to
cross-examination, a procedure which is not a formal part of the
local legislative process. But the more informal nature of city
council meetings certainly does not prohibit sharp questioning of
witnesses and close examination of data presented by those
witnesses. Most municipalities have access to professional
analysis of development proposals, either from their own staff or
by contract with private planning firms or higher level
governmental organizations (county or state). Granted, the track
record for local government scrutiny of development special
district requests has not been stellar, as Professor Odinet notes.22
But their past record does not mean that local government
officials cannot be trusted to provide proper scrutiny of
development proposals, particularly if proper guidance is given to
those officials in state enabling legislation.
As Professor Odinet chronicles, special districts arose in
response to a variety of demands for infrastructure funding in
situations where the general taxing power of cities and counties
had been restricted, often reacting to some type of actual or
perceived overspending. Because special districts are created as
separate and distinct units of local government, they receive their
own taxing and spending authority and limitation.23 By
authorizing the establishment of special districts, states enable
the development and maintenance of public infrastructure,
20.
21.
22.
23.

Odinet, supra note 1, at 787.
Id.
Id. at 784.
See id. at 740 (explaining the independent nature of special districts).
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without requiring that infrastructure to compete for funding with
agencies and projects of general-purpose governmental entities
within whose borders the infrastructure may be located.24 As a
result, the total taxing and spending authority for public projects
within the geographic boundaries of a city or county is increased,
often by a considerable amount.
Professor Odinet devotes a substantial portion of his article
to a discussion of what he believes are the unintended
consequences of extensive reliance on development special
districts.25 His concerns that granting superpriority status to
development special district bonds can undermine vested
property rights, destabilize conventional real estate lending, and
have “a substantial negative effect on fundamental market
fairness”26 deserve serious attention. But these concerns can be
dealt with in the legislative process.
Elected officials can, and should, make taxing and spending
decisions. These decisions are subject to traditional constitutional
requirements that funds be used for public purposes.27 The courts
should not be called upon to judge the effectiveness or wisdom of
a particular project. That judgment is better left to the legislature
for two reasons: (1) such decisions require a careful weighing and
balancing of a number of factors, including the relative priority to
be given a particular project and the likelihood that the project
will produce the results sought; (2) voters expect the legislature,
rather than the judiciary, to make the required judgments.
In this context, the judiciary’s job is threefold: resolve
disputes regarding (1) the constitutionality of a particular
statute, (2) the legislature’s authority to enact the statute in
question, and (3) the applicability of a statute to a particular
24. See id. at 735 (noting that “cities often compete with one another for the
same projects” without special districts in place).
25. Id. at 758–78.
26. Id. at 773.
27. For evidence that courts are not necessarily better protectors of the
public purse, witness the judicial evolution of the Fifth Amendment’s “Takings”
Clause requirement of a “public use” from Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(upholding use of eminent domain and subsequent transfer of acquired property
to private persons in order to eliminate slums and blight) to Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (noting that acquisition of property and transfer to
private entities for economic development serves a proper public purpose).
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situation. Whether the statute in question is good or bad policy
should be left to the legislature.
Professor Odinet apparently does not believe that local and
state legislators are up to the task of making effective policy
judgments regarding development proposals seeking public
subsidies:
When cities and municipalities are being pushed to drive
economic growth and to spur new jobs and investment, there is
little chance that local government decision makers—much
less state legislators—will truly evaluate each development
special district request with a discerning eye . . . . With so
many economic and political pressures facing cities today in
terms of their role in the economic recovery, it is of little doubt
that every development special district request would meet
whatever criteria or narrow purpose the lawmaker could
craft.28

He cites “pressures put on American cities post the Great
Recession”29 and “the effects of the economic crisis on local
governments.”30 These pressures were, and continue to be,
extraordinary. In part, though, these pressures exist because of
modern tax and expenditure limitations, such as Proposition 13
in California.31
State and local governments are not perfect by any measure.
Elected officials at all levels of government are subject to intense
pressures to favor one or another interest group. Development
special districts are a product of the private developer interest
group. They can, and do, serve useful purposes. But their access
to superpriority status for their liens needs to be regulated, as
Professor Odinet rightly argues.
We disagree on the proper approach to this regulation. I
believe it can be accomplished by modifying state enabling
legislation as discussed above, rather than further hamstringing
state and local legislators with a required judicial proceeding,
which Professor Odinet advocates. Involving the courts in
protracted analyses of the prospects for success of particular
28.
29.
30.
31.

Odinet, supra note 1, at 784–85.
Id. at 784 n. 427.
Id. at 785 n. 428.
CALIF. CONST., art. XIII A (1978, as amended in 1986 and 2000).

190

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 181 (2015)

public-private infrastructure-based development proposals risks
turning the courts into super-legislative bodies in which lawyers
and judges replace voters and legislators. Perhaps I am naive, but
I believe state and local legislative bodies are up to the task of
regulating development special districts, if given proper
instructions in the enabling legislation.

